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PART Two 
"AS IF THE WORLD WERE SPLIT IN TWO:" CONTESTING DUALISMS 
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The End of Killing, the Law of the Mother 
and a Non-Exclusionary Other* 
by Dianne Rothleder 
Department of Philosophy, Loyola University, Chicago 
I. 
In the Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes tells a story that bears resemblance to Freud's 
discussion of the killing of the totemic father in Totem and Taboo and Lacan's dis-
cussion of the symbolic and the real. The story of the killing of the father (and an 
attempt to construct a feminine symbolic) also appears in Luce Irigaray's work. 
Here, the similarity stops. In this paper I will discuss the concerns that lead Hobbes 
towards reinventing the totemic father and those that lead lrigaray away from the 
myth of founding fathers and brothers and towards a myth of the mother. 
Briefly, Freud is attempting to explain "the two taboos of totemism .... The 
first...the law protecting the totem animal .... [and] the second rule, the prohibition of 
incest." ( 144) The totem animal is an animal that a "primitive" or "savage" clan 
identifies with and is not to kill or eat And yet occasionally there are festivals dur-
ing which the clan as a whole participates in killing, eating, celebrating and finally 
mourning the totem animal. (140-141) 
To explain this behavior, Freud argues that at some point in human history, pa-
triarchal fathers surrounded themselves with women and excluded the sons. The 
dispossessed sons banded together, "one day" killed the patriarchal father and 
"cannibal savages as they were, it goes without saying that they devoured their vic-
tim as well as killing him." (141-142) The totem meal, then, can be seen as com-
memorating the killing and eating of the father. 
• I would like to thank Cynthia Willett for helpful comments on an earlier draft 
of this paper. 
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Without a father, the brothers/sons had to restructure their social relations. 
Freud argues that the incest prohibition functioned as a way to avoid the jealousies 
and divisions that the primal father's singular power had kept at bay but that with 
many males desiring the same female could no longer be kept back. (143-144) 
Prohibiting incest is the renunciation of the females a male most desires. By giving 
up what he most desires, each man agrees to put a kind of social harmony above his 
own selfish interest. 
At this point, I want to situate Hobbes' tale vis-a-vis Freud's. Hobbes posits the 
State of Nature as a pre-civil fictional time when there was no social order. He 
characterizes it as a war of all against all in which every man has a right to every-
thing and desires power after power, and yet fears being killed. Eventually, people 
realize that this is no way to live and they agree to found a civil society in which 
they renounce all of their rights save the right to life. Their rights are given over to 
a sovereign who holds supreme power and who does not participate in the signing 
of the social contract. 
The State of Nature is fraught with patricide. The Civil Society defines a kind 
of super father who is akin either to Freud's primal father, or perhaps to the totem 
animal. Both readings have something to offer. As primal father, the sovereign 
keeps all the spoils to himself and ensures that there is no locus of power save him-
self As totemic animal, the sovereign can be seen as a creation of equals who fear 
the ability they have to kill one another and who wish to displace the ability through 
an agreement to renounce much of what they desire. 
The one desire that cannot be renounced on either reading is the desire to live. 
And this is the source of both tremendous tension and a psychically baroque con-
struct meant to resolve this tension. 
Within a nation, citizens have all agreed to the social contract, but no sovereigns 
of any nation are party to the contract and so relations between nations are not con-
tractual. The result is that nations are in a perpetual war with one another and each 
nation needs soldiers to fight. 
Soldiers die. This fact presents Hobbes with a dilemma because the state must 
prosecute wars and yet it may not cause the death of its citizens, for to do so is to 
risk the return to the State of Nature. Hobbes' solution is his infamous use of mer-
cenaries. He writes: 
Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight 
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against the enemy, though his Sovereign ?ave Right enough to p.unish 
his refusal! with death, may neverthelesse m many cases refuse, without 
Injustice; as when he substitutheth a sufficient Souldier in his place .... 
(269) 
Hobbes goes on to tell us that regularly conscripted soldiers are at times cowards 
and they run away from battle. This running away is cowardly and dishonorable 
and feminine, but not unjust. A mercenary, however, is not entitled to the benefit of 
the doubt. Hobbes writes, "But he that inrowleth himselfe as a Souldier, or taketh 
imprest money, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature .... " (27) 
What is at work here, in a psychoanalytic interpretation, is the psychic dis-
placement of agency. That is, the sovereign cannot take from the sons the right to 
life, and yet some sons must die. Wealthy sons give money to poor sons and the 
poor sons become the ones who risk their lives. But because no one can desire 
death, for Hobbes, somehow the poor sons must not be agents in the transaction; 
rather, agency is displaced onto poverty itself. Thus, it is poverty that agrees to risk 
death, and not an actual person. Just as the sons displace the power of the father 
through the totem animal, so they displace the risk of death through the use of pov-
erty. The totem animal cannot be the father any more than poverty can be an agent, 
but these stories are psychically necessary for Hobbes to maintain the security of the 
state, and this, after all, is a major concern for him. 
What is missing from Hobbes' discussion and Freud's analysis is any mention of 
female or feminine position. Such a position might well provide the end to killing 
that Hobbes is looking for-an end which does not require killing. But before I get 
to Irigaray's work, which does provide such a position, I want to sketch a Lacanian 
reading of Hobbes because lrigaray's work uses both Freud and Lacan. 
The main terms ofLacan's that are relevant here are the symbolic, the imaginary, 
the real, the Other, the other (obj et petit a), and the master signifier. The symbolic 
is the realm of language, the medium of all experience; the imaginary is the pre-
symbolic infant's connection with its mother; the real is one's greatest imagined fear, 
the fear of confronting one's death. 
Slavoj Zizek writes, "The Lacanian 'big Other' is usually conceived as the im-
personal symbolic order, the structure that regulates symbolic exchanges; what is 
forgotten thereby is the crucial fact that the big Other ... was first introduced to des-
ignate the radical alterity of the other person .... " (Zizek 199) The Other, then, is 
both the totality of language and linguistic interaction and any particular member of 
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this system. The objet petit a is that with which we invest possibility for compensat-
ing us for loss. (Bracher, 42-45) The loss is that which we posit based on our fan-
tasy of once having been connected to our mothers in the imaginary; it is equally the 
loss we feel as we realize that the Other cannot provide us with connectedness; and 
it is the loss we feel when any one obj et petit a fails us. Of course, every objet petit 
~ fails to provide a connection that is only a fantasy construct in the first place. 
Finally, the notion of the master signifier is that which embodies the surplus 
cathected meaning of the big Other. That is, God, the Nation, the Party, the Team, 
the Ethnic group, in short, whatever construct holds supreme meaning and emotion, 
with which one identifies, but which in the end still fails to provide real connection. 
With all of this in mind, I want to re-read Hobbes' story of the social construct, 
civil society, and the use of mercenaries which guarantees the security of the free 
state. 
The State of Nature, for Hobbes, functions as the real- that most terrifying 
possibility that is never actually experienced but which fills our fantasies with 
dread. Hobbes posits the State of Nature in order to guard civil society from col-
lapse. The State of Nature is the realm of certain death, certain loss of personal 
property, complete lack of value and authority. Civil society, then, must function as 
the counterpoint to all of this. No death, no loss, total value and complete authority. 
Civil society functions as the symbolic. The symbolic, again, is the realm of 
language and meaning as a structural system of differences. Symbolic meaning is 
based not upon connection with an other, but rather upon differences from an other. 
Difference as fundamental experience is the experience of the masculine, and so the 
symbolic can be thought of as gendered masculine. It should be no surprise then 
that as Hobbes constructs his symbolic realm, he hardly bothers mentioning females, 
the feminine, mothering, or connection. These are the provenance of the imaginary. 
The real meaning of the masculine symbolic is found not within the symbolic it-
self: but rather within the representative of the totality of the symbolic- the sover-
eign. The sovereign is the master signifier from whom aJl authority flows and who 
is perceived by the citizens as the embodiment of all meaning, all power, all mascu-
linity. The sovereign, further, is a conduit of God and so has divine right as well. 
The emotional tie to the sovereign is crucial for maintaining the stability of the 
state and for guarding against the real. The sovereign, then, is charged with protect-
ing the citizens from their dread death. Any disruption of this duty risks mass psy-
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chosis and the concomitant collapse of the order of meaning. Here it is obvious 
why the issue of mercenaries and the draft is so important. The state that-protects us 
cannot simultaneously be the state that kills us. 
Hobbes, then, depends upon a series of objets petit a. Those soldiers who go 
willingly desire to prove their worthiness to the sovereign by risking everything. 
The fantasy, then, is one of passive narcissism in which the soldier wants to be more 
worthy than thou. (Bracher, 44-45) Hobbes' term for this is honor. 
Those soldiers who go as mercenaries desire money to buy sustenance; that is, 
they desire to live. A class-based analysis would refuse the notion of fantasy and 
enjoyment and would focus instead upon wealth, poverty, and slave or wage labor. 
What a Lacanian analysis adds to this is a notion that psychic goods are bought and 
sold even as are material goods. 
The mercenary is the guarantor of the security of the free state in that the merce-
nary ensures that the real will be kept at bay. By taking money for the death risk, 
the mercenary has displaced the real. That is, war is the real for the wealthy son, 
impoverished death is the real for the poor son. They exchange reals, though it is an 
uneven exchange to be sure, for the wealthy son does not becom~ poor nor does he 
risk death of any sort. 
Hobbes' entire account can be seen as an attempt to displace the real so that no 
one, fearing death, goes on a rampage and threatens someone else with death. His 
displacement of the real, his creation of a master signifier, his construction of a ' 
masculine symbolic all work to create and maintain a social order that keeps death 
at bay. This, of course, is an impossible task. Death does not stop, nor can a system 
of displacing killing and the risk of death really be the end of killing and risking 
death. 
In the next section I will turn to the work of Luce Irigaray who takes up both 
Freud's notion of the murder of the primal father and Lacan's notion of a masculine 
symbolic and adds to them a feminine component. By adding the feminine, Irigaray 
undermines both systems and shows, I would argue, that Hobbes' masculine politi-
cal system is untenable, unjust, and even absurd. 
n. 
In "Body Against Body: In Relation to the Mother," Irigaray discusses the mur-
der of the primal father as the foundation of psychoanalysis. She writes: 
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When Freud, notably in Totem and Taboo, describes and theorizes 
about the murder of the father as the founding act for the primal horde 
he is forgetting an even more ancient murder, that of the woman-mother: 
which was necessary to the foundation of a specific order in the city. 
(II) 
The murder Irigaray goes on to discuss is that of Clytemnestra in the Orestia. 
Clytemnestra is murdered by her son Orestes because Clytemnestra killed her lover 
Agamemnon. Agamemnon was killed because he killed Iphigenia, his and 
Clytemnestra's daughter, in order to secure the release of Helen. 
What is significant about this story for lrigaray is first that psychoanalysis ig-
nores it in favor of the story of Oedipus, second, that it, and Oedipus as well, con-
tains no critique of male madness, and third, that blame is attached to female mad-
ness and desire rather than to male madness. Irigaray writes: 
Every theory and practice derived from psychoanalysis seems to be 
based upon the ambivalence that Oedipus feels toward his father. An 
ambivalence that aims at the father but is projected retroactively upon 
the primitive relation to the mother's body. (I3) 
Psychoanalysis constructs the Oedipus story in such a way that it fails to critique the 
father relation and instead attacks the mother. There is no language of male mad-
ness that remains with the male; rather male madness is always displaced onto the 
nearest overly-domineering or hysterical female. Menelaus' mad desire for Helen 
cannot be talked about as a masculine problem, but only as a feminine problem; 
Oedipus' father-conflicts become mother/separation problems. 
The political result of the impossibility of talking about male madness is the 
separation of male and female realms. Feminine, domestic, private space is the 
space of madness. In order to protect sons and fathers from this madness, the public 
realm becomes the true space for the masculine. 
In Lacanian terms, we live in the symbolic or masculine space, and we posit a 
pre-symbolic imaginary connection with the mother. This connection is, however, 
merely a fantasy that gets played out through fetishized objects which substitute for 
a felt but ungrounded connection. 
The way all of this plays out in Hobbes, on my reading, that the State of Nature 
can be seen as male madness run amok. The crazed greed for power after power is 
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the fetishization of objets petit a which are meant to reconstitute the mother-relation. 
The State of Nature, then, threatens civil society with the return of male madness. 
The social contract, then, can be seen as an agreement to substitute female mad-
ness for male madness; that is to construct a symbolic grounded upon the impossi-
bility of male madness. Necessarily, then, the symbolic must be Oedipal, must 
blame the mother, rather than be concerned with Clytemnestra. To question the 
father, to suggest that there might be male madness, to side with the mother, is to 
risk falling back into the State of Nature. 
The role of the mercenary is to act out a kind of pretend male madness as a tal-
isman against real male madness, a catharsis. The mercenary is a substitute, one 
who fights so that another need not. The non-combatant can take satisfaction in the 
madness displayed by his paid substitute without himself partaking in the madness. 
The mercenary is under legal contract, his duties spelled out in language. As sue~ 
the mercenary is still well within the symbolic realm and so cannot be mistaken for 
the pre-symbolic State of Nature. Because war is compelled by the sovereign and is 
controlled, male madness cannot run amok. 
The sovereign, here, functions as a limit on male madness, a guarantor of female 
madness, and as a doubly gendered surrogate parent whose lineage goes up to God. 
Male madness is limited through the contractual use of mercenaries and the prose-
cution of limited wars and female madness is guaranteed as the contractual founda-
tion of the symbolic/civil society. 
As doubly gendered, the sovereign both embodies masculine authority and sug-
gests the possibility of imaginary connection. Further, the sovereign is both creator 
and sustainer of the civil society. Far from being egalitarian, however, the double-
gendering of the sovereign is a masculine doubling. That is, the masculine authority 
fantasizes a feminine and enacts that fantasy. As fantasy, this pseudo-feminine fails 
to take seriously the feminine. Fantasy, after all, is meant to satisfy the fantasizer 
and not the object of fantasy. 
What Irigaray does is to develop a feminine symbolic; that is, a symbolic that 
takes seriously the feminine position, that refuses double-gendering, and that can be 
seen as a critique of Hobbes, Freud, and Lacan. In what follows, I will sketch out 
lrigaray's feminine symbolic. 
In laying out the foundations of the new symbolic, Irigaray writes: 
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The genital drive is theoretically that drive by which the phallic penis 
captures the mother's power to give birth, nourish, inhabit, center. 
Doesn't the phallic erection occur at the place where the umbilical cord 
once was? The phallus becomes the organizer of the world through the 
man-father at the very place where the umbilical cord, that primal link to 
the mother, once gave birth to the father. (Body Against Body, 13-14) 
Freud's focus on the penis as the organ of pleasure and creation par excellance guar-
antees that female bodily experience is seen as lesser than that of the male. To the 
extent that bodies are taken up by the language function of the symbolic (which is 
Lacan's term), language will mimic this hierarchy of bodies. What Irigaray wants to 
do with the umbilical cord is to give a different bodily basis to the symbolic and so 
to restructure the symbolic. This is a crucial task because personal identity is con-
structed within the symbolic. A phallic symbolic metaphorically based upon the 
functioning of penises ensures that those who lack penises will have psychic prob-
lems. 
Unlike the penis, the umbilical cord is part of everyone. We all bear the mark of 
having been attached to a placenta, a uterus, a mother, and we have all been cut 
apart at birth. Thus, the umbilical cord gives grounding to the fantasy of the imagi-
nary-there really was a link. At the same time, the umbilical cord represents the 
coming into the symbolic. As it is cut, the infant is individuated, comes into its own 
body, and is named. 
Because we all have navels, we need not posit some primal connection with a 
mother. We need merely touch our bellies to know that we indeed had this connec-
tion. By bringing the imaginary into the symbolic, Irigaray helps us have a language 
of connection rather than silence and fantasy. In "Body Against Body," she says 
that: 
it is desirable that we should speak as we are making love. We should 
also speak as we feed a baby so that the child does not feel that the milk 
is being stuffed down his or her throat, in a kind of rape. It is equally 
important for us to speak as we caress another body. Silence is all the 
more alive when words exist. Let us not become the guardians of dumb 
silence, of lead silence. (19) 
Dumb dead silence is the silence of the imaginary posited within masculine fantasy. 
Fantasy speaks for one and silences the other. The imaginary connection must be 
brought into the symbolic, into language. 
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Further, language must be stretched to give voice to male madness without 
threatening a war of all against all. Perhaps within a symbolized imaginary, male 
madness can find a voice. If the symbolic is not merely the father-relation, then a 
son's expressing disaffection with his father does not lead to utter collapse. By 
symbolizing the imaginary, then, Irigaray opens up the possibility for critique of the 
father. 
Tue masculine symbolic is based upon a variety of exclusions. When Lacan 
writes, "Woman does not have a phallus, she is the phallus" he is suggesting that the 
symbolic is set up as a way for man to cope with having lost a connection that he 
desperately desires to reestablish. The most powerful thing in such a system is that 
which promises the reconnection. If the phallus is power, then woman is power. 
The problem with this, however, is that the power of woman is a male fantasy based 
upon a never-existing event. The fantasy of woman as phallus is so terrifying that it 
gets re-written as woman has no penis and hence is powerless. The masculine psy-
chic mechanism here is to invest woman with power, to fear the power, then to strip 
it away. And all of this is fantasy, the wordless unsymbolized masculine imaginary. 
Hobbes' fantasies of the terror of the State of Nature and the sovereign as all-
powerful savior work in similar ways. Male madness is the wordless terror that 
leads to ultimate destruction. The sovereign becomes invested with the phallus to 
save us all. But the sovereign cannot save us all and so mercenaries, who have no 
phallus, are charged with this responsibility, which, of course, is an impossible task 
based on a wordless fantasy. We cannot be saved from death, we cannot recreate a 
connection that never happened. 
What Irigaray's feminine symbolic gives all of us in place of baroque psychic 
constructs is a place in a language, a sense of connection and individuation. Fur-
ther, she provides distinctly gendered relationships to creation. This means that she 
leaves space for both motherhood and fatherhood. Motherhood is broadened be-
yond babies. She writes: 
We also need to discover and declare that we are always mothers by 
being women. We bring many things to the world apart from childr~n, 
we give birth to many other things apart from children: . love, desIT~, 
language, art, social things, political things, religious thmgs, but this 
kind of creativity has been forbidden to us for centuries. We must take 
back this maternal creative dimension that is our birthright as women. 
(BAB 18) 
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Motherhood, here, becomes any and every female creation. This becomes possible 
only when there is feminine position within language. 
Fatherhood, which has been as excluded from the symbolic as has feminine 
creation, also finds a place in Irigaray. She writes: 
Phallic erection, far from being all-powerful, would be the masculine 
version of the umbilical cord. If phallic erection respected the life of the 
mother-of the mother in every woman and the woman in every 
mother-it would repeat the living bond to the mother.... The penis 
evokes something of the life within the womb as it stiffens, touches, and 
spills out, passing beyond the skin and the will. (BAB 17) 
By bringing the feminine into the symbolic, Irigaray creates the space for the mas-
culine to have a real, rather than a fantasy, relationship to the feminine, to female 
creation, and to parenting. If the penis is physically like but not the same as the 
umbilical cord, then the father has his own physical relation to the baby. He not 
only bears a navel, he also reenacts the umbilical bond with every erection and cli-
max. What is brilliant about this idea is that it talces the traditionally most hyper-
macho male event and feminizes it, thus making clear that this feminine symbolic 
has no truck with macho wordless rape. Sex is not, for Irigaray, concerned with 
control, but rather with evoking creation and life. 
Clearly, fatherhood for Irigaray is not Freud's primal father or totem animal 
substitute. And clearly, motherhood is not hysterical, domineering, or absent for 
Irigaray unlike for Freud. Irigaray wants to tell Clytemnestra's story and retell 
Oedipus' story to suggest other possible founding myths for organizing sociality. 
By grounding gender fantasies on the body, and by choosing a universal site for 
this grounding, Irigaray rewrites the imaginary fantasy of connection so that it is 
non-exclusionary. Further, she opens up space for feminine creation and masculine 
connection. These steps make Hobbes' whole system collapse. Power does not 
function as a limitless and yet always impotent series of attempts to regain lost con-
nection; rather, power is about creation and separation, both of which are present in 
the meaning of the umbilical cord. 
In the end, Irigaray rejects the fundamental tenets of the Hobbesian world. She 
refuses the absence of the mother and the concomitant attempts to find the mother. 
This move, alone, means that there is no war of all against all as men try to acquire 
power after power. Without the threat of the State of Nature, Hobbes' masculine 
symbolic collapses, and he has no need for mercenaries or contracts or a sovereign. 
disC/osure 5 (1996): REASON INCorporated 
The End of Killing 73 
By bringing the mother into the symbolic, Irigaray gives us a foundation for a state 
that would not need to be concerned with security. 
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